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Greece, a country which borders the Ionian and Mediterranean Sea, was important to Britain. This was due 
to Greece’s location, which is close to Britain’s sea communications and oil supplies. Therefore, Greece’s 
safety was of utmost priority to Britain so the latter could secure its predominance in the Mediterranean 
region. When the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) broke out in March 1946, Britain, and specifically Foreign 
Secretary Ernest Bevin, determined in helping the Greek Royalist government, fought against Greek 
communists by providing economic and military support. Should Greece fall under communist influence, 
Britain would lose its dominance in Greece and the Mediterranean region. However a year later, Britain 
decided to withdraw its troops even though the Civil War in Greece was not yet over. This article will 
discuss in detail, from Bevin’s perspective, the decision to withdraw from Greece as he was the one who 
initially refused to cut military spending in Greece as proposed by the Treasury, and it was he who 
eventually accepted the proposal. Previous studies have unanimously argued that Britain’s poor economic 
and military circumstances were Bevin’s greatest worries, which led to Bevin’s decision to discontinue 
Britain’s aid to Greece. This article, however, will identify Bevin’s other reasons that are absent from the 
literature. Through the methodology of British primary records, this article found that Greece’s support for 
the enosis (union) movement, and that Cyprus wanted to be returned to Greece, were also factors that 
influenced Bevin’s decision to accept the termination of British aid to Greece.  
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World War II in Europe ended after the Allied Powers accepted Germany’s surrender on 8 May 
1945. Despite this victory, the Allied Powers, especially Britain, suffered significant monetary losses during 
this war. According to Callaghan, about a quarter of Britain’s national wealth had been used during World 
War II, and therefore Britain was burdened with an enormous imbalance of trade and a massive overseas 
debt (Callaghan, 2007). The enormous expenditure on World War II exhausted Britain’s resources and 
affected its economy. Thus, at the beginning of post-World War II Britain was overwhelmed by social 
problems such as poverty, unemployment and malnutrition. These domestic crises brought a painful 
dilemma for the government when handling Britain’s foreign affairs: finding a way to fix its economic 
problem while at the same time maintaining its overseas defence responsibilities (Baylis, 1993). 
This dilemma remained a legacy of conflict within the Cabinet for the next few years. It was a 
difficult task for the British defence planners to develop a coherent defence policy during a period when 
Britain was suffering from economic and military weakness. This allowed the Soviet Union to push its 
frontiers forward and threaten Britain’s sphere of influence in Greece. The Soviet Union was eager to 
broaden its domination in Greece after World War II ended because it needed new warm-water ports and 
extra bases in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean regions, hence making Greece a satisfactory option 
(Kuniholm, 1980; Leffler, 1985). The Soviets’ expansionist policy apparently brought conflict with Britain 
as the latter needed to safeguard British communication networks from the Mediterranean region to the 
British Eastern Empire by its strong presence in Greece (Kuniholm, 1980).  
During a meeting with Allied members in December 1945 at the Moscow Conference, the Soviets 
demanded that Britain stopped its interference in Greek internal affairs, but the latter refused (Roberts, 
2011). Subsequently in March 1946, the Greek Civil War broke out and the communist insurgents in Greece 
received military supplies from Greece’s neighbours, namely Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Romania (CAB, 
1948).1 It is worth noting here that these three neighbours of Greece were satellite countries of the Soviet 
Union. Thus, Britain was sure that the Kremlin in Moscow had orchestrated the civil war given that the 
Soviets were reluctant to have anti-communist governments on its doorstep (Boyle, 1990). 
Both British Chiefs of Staff (hereafter COS) and British Secretary of State Ernest Bevin believed 
that British communication lines, as well as its oil supplies, could be seriously affected if Greece fell under 
Soviet domination (CAB, 1946; CAB, 1946).2 To prevent this unfavourable outcome, it was necessary for 
Britain to help Greece given that the army of the Greek Royalist government was ill-equipped and ill-
trained to combat communist agressions independently. The British government therefore agreed to 
continue supporting Greece through economic and military aid, even though Britain itself suffered from 
economic crisis (Hansard, 1945; DEFE, 1947).3 Bevin asserted that: ‘[Britain accepts] responsibility for 
giving guidance for the training and development of the Greek Army in order that they might be able to 
defend themselves against any attack from their neighbours’ (CAB, 1947).4 
 
1 CAB 129/23, CP (48) 7, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘Review of Soviet Policy’, 5 January 1948. 
2 CAB 131/12, DO (46) 40, 13 March 1946; CAB 133/86, PMM (46) 1, Chiefs of Staff to the Defence Committee, 20 April 1946. 
3 Hansard, 20 August 1945, Vol. 413 (London: H.M.S.O., 1945), p. 289; DEFE 5/3, COS (47) 9 (0) Final, Aide Memoir by the Chiefs 
of Staff, 23 January 1947. 
4 CAB 129/16, CP (47) 34, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘Policy towards Greece and Turkey’, 25 
January 1947. 
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However, all parties that championed this aid policy to Greece, such as Bevin and his Foreign Office, 
the COS and also the Minister of Defence, Albert V. Alexander, were pressured by the Treasury to cut these 
expensive aids to Greece. This was apparently because there was no improvement in Britain’s own 
economic difficulties, and it saw further dramatic deterioration by the end of February 1947 (Morgan, 
1985). Subsequently, the decision to withdraw from Greece was officially taken by the British government 
in March 1947.   
 
2. Problem Statement 
Britain’s economic crisis worsened in early 1947 when severe winter storms hit Britain throughout 
January and February 1947. This economic difficulty was seen as a huge disaster by the Foreign Office (FO 
371, 1946).5 Hugh Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer, questioned the relevance of aid for Greece and 
whether it should be continued (CAB, 1947).6 The Treasury urgently required manpower to operate 
industries in Britain so that its plan for economic recovery could be successfully accomplished (CAB, 
1946).7 Dalton therefore strongly proposed the cessation of aid given to Greece due to Britain’s domestic 
problems. Clement Attlee, Britain’s Prime Minister, concurred with Dalton on this matter. While Bevin 
continued to emphasise his beliefs that the Greek Royalist government’s army would be unable to 
independently resist communist insurgents, he eventually acquiesced to the Cabinet’s preference that 
Britain ended its commitment to Greece.  
Don Cook and other scholars agreed that the reason Bevin accepted the decision to evacuate was 
due to pressure put by Dalton and Attlee because of their concerns for Britain’s economic situation (Cook, 
1989). Other historians that have also studied this withdrawal issue from the perspective of domestic affairs 
in Britain were Higgins (1984), Young (1996), McCauley (2016), Dockrill and Hopkins (2006). McCauley 
(2016), Higgins (1984), Dockrill and Hopkins (2006) argued that due to Britain’s worsening economic 
difficulties at the beginning of 1947, the British government proclaimed in mid-February 1947 that Britain 
was unable to continue supporting the Greek Royalist army, and therefore had to cease British aid to Greece 
at the end of March 1947. Young (1996) also agreed, writing that ‘the US must either take on Britain’s role 
as protector of Near Eastern states from Russia or witness a major advance for communism’. 
These historians have paid substantial attention to the issue of Britain’s economic weakness in being 
the reason for Britain’s decision to cease its economic and military aid to Greece in March 1947. This 
scenario showed that other circumstances (such as those argued by this article, which included Greece’s 
support for the enosis movement), that might have also had a vital impact on Bevin’s endorsement for the 
withdrawal of British troops from Greece, were given less consideration. 
It is useful to highlight here that this enosis issue, and its relation to Bevin’s new attitude towards 
the complete removal of the British army from Greece, is new to the literature. Thus, this article 
complements a gap in the existing literature, and presents an in-depth review and discussion on Britain’s 
evacuation from Greece by exploring beyond Britain’s domestic affairs.    
 
5 FO 371/66546/U5471/5471/G, Foreign Office Minute, ‘Mr C.F.A. Warner Views on Preparation of New “Stock-taking 
Memorandum”’, 24 December 1946. 
6 CAB 131/5, DO (47) 6th Meeting, Defence Committee, ‘Greece: Previous Reference: DO (46) 9th Meeting, Minute 5’, 3 March 
1947. 
7 CAB 131/1, DO (46) 27th Meeting, Views by Secretary of State, ‘Questions of Defence’, 16 November 1946. 
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3. Research Questions 
The primary aim of this article is to identify Bevin’s point of view on the decision to cease Britain’s 
aid to Greece at the time of Britain’s many problems. At a domestic level, Britain suffered from economic 
difficulties. In regards to Britain’s foreign affairs, there were many problems that appeared during this 
period. But this article will only focus on the issue involving Greece, specifically Greece’s support for 
enosis (union) with Cyprus. It should be noted here that Cyprus belonged to Britain as part of its Crown 
Colony.  
Previous studies on Britain’s decision to withdraw from Greece have concentrated on Britain’s 
domestic affairs. Because Britain was struggling with its own economic problems, Britain therefore had no 
choice but to cut-off Britain’s financial and military assistance to Greece. This article however, seeks to 
relate this evacuation decision to the question of enosis involving Cyprus and Greece to further understand 
Bevin’s change of stance in leaving the Greek Royalist government to overcome the communist insurgents 
by itself. 
In order to clearly explain the argument that there was a link between Bevin’s new stance on the 
withdrawal issue and Greece’s support for the enosis movement, this withdrawal matter must be analysed 
thoroughly through the eyes of Bevin, the person who was responsible in handling all matters of foreign 
affairs.   
4. Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this article is to identify other reasons for Bevin's new attitude towards the Treasury’s 
proposal to cut-off British aid to Greece, which commenced in April 1947. It is worth noting here that the 
suggestion for cuts in military overseas spending had been issued by the Treasury since the beginning of 
the post-World War II period in mid-1945. This was due to Britain’s economic difficulties. But Bevin 
refused the proposal as he thought it would be a mistake given the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union 
in Eastern Europe that could threaten Britain’s predominance in the Mediterranean region.  
This article recognizes the validity in the argument posed by previous studies in regards to Britain’s 
economic weakness forcing Bevin to change his long-standing objection to stop aid to Greece. This article, 
however, seeks to present a comprehensive account of the evacuation decision by studying this issue from 
an angle that has yet to be explored by historians – Bevin’s anger at Greece due to the latter’s support for 
the enosis movement. This article illustrates that the question of enosis troubling Britain at the time was 
also a factor that led to Bevin’s decision to cease British aid to Greece, even though the Greek Civil War 
was far from over. 
Enosis was a movement initiated by Cyprus islanders of Greek descent, namely the Greek Cypriots, 
whose aim was for the political union of Greece and Cyprus. Their desire for enosis found its beginnings 
in the era of the Ottoman rule and was manifested later at the time of British occupation of Cyprus (Kelling, 
1990). This enosis movement intensified at the end of World War II due to Britain’s readiness to discuss 
the issue (Hatzivassiliou, 1997). However, given that Britain’s predominance in the Middle East depended 
on its strong presence in Cyprus, it would be unwise to surrender to the demands for enosis when Greece 
was on the brink of falling into Soviet domination. An unusual situation later arose and annoyed Bevin 
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when Greece, which was currently being supported financially and militarily by Britain in combating Greek 
communist insurgents, demanded Britain to return Cyprus to Greece. 
This article therefore demonstrates new perspectives in regard to Bevin’s new attitude towards the 
complete removal of British troops from Greece by focusing on his frustration towards Greece, a country 
that received economic and military aid from Britain, but at the same time desired an enosis movement that 
directly challenged British sovereignty in Cyprus. 
  
5. Research Methods 
This article revolves around Foreign Secretary Bevin’s decision to evacuate British forces from 
Greece although the latter was still fighting a civil war. A qualitative method was adopted by this article, 
which involved extensive scrutiny of British primary records that relate to Britain’s diplomatic history and 
policymaking during the period that concerns this article. The National Archives in London and the 
Brotherton Library at the University of Leeds held the primary records used in this article. The secondary 
sources were retrieved from three different libraries: the British Library in London, the Brotherton Library 
and the Edward Boyle Library at the University of Leeds. 
The archival records used in this article comprised of Papers of the Foreign Office (FO371), Papers 
of the Cabinet Office (CAB), Papers of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (DEFE), Bevin’s Private Papers 
(FO800), Papers of the Prime Minister’s Office (PREM) and Papers of the Colonial Office (CO). These 
materials contain minutes of meetings, officials’ reports, letters and recommendations regarding Britain’s 
economic and military weaknesses in the early post-World War II era, the situation in Greece, the 
importance of Britain’s sphere of influence in Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean area, and the Soviet 
Union’s expansionist policies in post-World War II Eastern Europe. The reliability of these materials are 
indisputable given that they were documented at the time of the aforementioned situations or events. Other 
archival materials, namely the Hansard (House of Commons Parliamentary Debate), were retrieved through 
internet access. This article also used published primary materials such as memoirs and secondary sources 
such as books and journal articles to complement its interpretation of issues. 
In showing that Greece’s support for the enosis movement was also a decisive factor in Bevin’s 
decision to end Britain’s financial and military assistance to Greece, the information from FO 371, CAB 
and DEFE – which mentioned Britain’s economic depression and British aid to Greece – will be extracted 
and scrutinized thoroughly, then compared with materials from FO 800 and FO 371, which contains records 
surrounding Greece and its approval for the enosis movement.   
 
6. Findings 
The question of Britain’s defence and military commitments in overseas theatres could never be 
treated or handled separately from its own economic or political matters because there were always 
budgetary and bipartisan political aspects to be considered (Abadi, 1982). Given that Britain’s economy 
was gravely weakened after World War II, there was a dilemma within the Cabinet on which of Britain's 
responsibilities should be made the utmost urgent or given priority over others. Secretary of State Bevin 
and Defence Minister Alexander held the same point of view: that the occupation of British forces in 
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Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East should continue to exist (FO 800, 1946).8 The decision to 
sustain British forces overseas was taken in response to the Soviet Union’s military and ideological 
expansion throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union’s interest in Greece, Turkey and Iran. These 
three countries were important in securing British national interests, primarily in the Middle East and the 
Eastern Mediterranean region (CAB, 1946; DEFE, 1947).9 Therefore, the call for cuts in military spending 
was seen as a great mistake (CAB, 1946).10 
However, the decision to continue armed services abroad worsened domestic affairs in Britain. The 
shortage of manpower in Britain’s industries became one of the major contributions to Britain’s economic 
problems. As noted by Dalton to the Defence Committee, Britain was nearly one million men short of the 
required minimum to achieve the revival of export trade in Britain (Baylis, 1993). Because Britain's 
finances worsened in early 1947, the Chancellor of the Exchequer Dalton pressured the government to cut 
back on its defence expenditures and manpower services. Dalton also alerted the Cabinet that Britain would 
face economic catastrophe if there was a delay in cutting off military and defence expenditures (Dalton, 
1962; CAB, 1947).11 
Dalton demanded Bevin to reconsider Britain’s financial assistance to Greece. Bevin however, 
contended that Greece was incompetent in combating communist insurgents without crucial military and 
financial support from Britain. Bevin thereupon begged the Treasury to defer any arrangements to halve 
Britain’s aid to Greece (CAB, 1947).12 But strangely, not long after Bevin pleaded for postponement of the 
reduction plan, he changed his mind and yielded to the Treasury’s plan to axe significant military and 
defence expenditures. Attlee and Dalton, however, proposed for a complete withdrawal from Greece as 
they were concerned that halved cuts in military spending on Greece would be insufficient to rescue 
Britain’s resources, and thus the plan for economic reconstruction would fail miserably. Bevin, surprisingly, 
agreed with this proposal. It is worth pointing here that, Bevin had successfully held back cuts in military 
spending for almost two years (CAB, 1946).13 Thus, apart from the issue of Britain’s economic weakness, 
there must be another factor – the question of enosis – that influenced Bevin in changing his decision on 
this matter. 
The issue of Cyprus and the enosis movement coincided with a series of difficulties involving British 
foreign matters that occurred because of the economic depression at the beginning of post-World War II 
Britain. These difficulties included the declining status of Britain as a Great Power, the problem in 
maintaining Britain’s military commitment to its overseas theatres, specifically Greece, and the struggle to 
maintain Britain’s privilege in the Middle East. 
Britain encountered problems with the Greek Cypriots and their demand for enosis ever since they 
became an official sovereign power in Cyprus in 1878. As Cyprus was a valuable asset to Britain due to its 
strategic geographical location, where it could help Britain maintain its predominance in the Eastern 
 
8 Retrieved from Brotherton Library, FO 800/474/PM/46/4/Man/46/3, Bevin to Attlee, 14 January 1946. 
9 CAB 80/99, COS (46) 45 (0), 13 February 1946; DEFE 5/3, COS (47) 9th Meeting (0) Final, Aide Memoir by the Chiefs of Staff, 
23 January 1947. 
10 CAB 131/1, DO (46) 22nd Meeting, 19 July 1946. 
11 CAB 131/1, DO (46) 1st Meeting, Reports by Chancellor of the Exchequer, 11 January 1947. 
12 CAB 129/16, CP (47) 34, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘Policy towards Greece and Turkey’, 25 
January 1947. 
13 CAB 131/1, DO (46) 27th Meeting, Views by Secretary of State, ‘Questions of Defence’, 16 November 1946. 
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Mediterranean area, Cyprus therefore needed to remain British (PREM, 1941; FO 371, 1941; CAB, 1941; 
FO 371, 1941; CO, 1941).14 
Greece, the country that Cyprus wanted to unite with, was often inconsistent with its reaction to the 
enosis movement. At the early stages of the enosis movement, Greece welcomed Cyprus. However, 
Greece’s positive attitude towards enosis changed when it began pursuing a good relationship with Britain 
after 1923. This matter was made evident when Greece became reluctant in backing the Greek Cypriots 
during their 1931 revolt. Greece firmly reminded the Greek Cypriots that the Greeks had nothing to do with 
the Greek Cypriots’ dispute with the British administration in Cyprus (Hatzivassiliou, 1997). Nevertheless, 
Greece pursued enosis again at the end of World War II, stating that Cyprus belonged to Greece.  
With strong support from Greece, the Greek Cypriots’ demand for enosis grew stronger and more 
organised. Thus, from December 1946 onwards, the enosis campaign intensified. This matter placed great 
pressure on Bevin, who was already dealing with multiple crises at the same time. It is worth reminding 
here that Bevin, at the time, was struggling to defend his stance to continue Britain’s commitments to 
Greece because of the escalation of the Greek Civil War into a full-scale rebellion in December 1946, which 
was fiercely fought through all of 1947. Amidst increasing difficulties in Greece because of the Civil War, 
and even though the Greek Royalist government’s battle against the Greek communist insurgents seemed 
unpromising, the Greek Royalist government warmly supported the enosis movement that would obviously 
harm British rule in Cyprus. 
Based on minutes from the Foreign Office, Bevin was outraged at Greece’s support of enosis. During 
a meeting with Greek diplomat M. Aghnidis in December 1946 in London, Bevin said that it was ‘senseless 
to hand Cyprus to Greece if that country was on the point of going communist’ (FO 371, 1946).15 Bevin 
reckoned that should the Greek communist insurgents win the war, both Greece and Cyprus would 
definitely become satellite countries of the Soviet Union. Should this happen, it would be only a matter of 
time before the Soviet Union would replace Britain as the new dominant power in the Mediterranean. What 
is more, Britain was contributing to the Greek Civil War by providing the Greek Royalist government with 
financial and military supplies even though Britain itself was struggling economically. Therefore, Bevin 
despised Greece for selfishly asking Britain to return Cyprus to Greece at this critical and inappropriate 
moment (FO 371, 1946).16 
In the months following Bevin’s heated conversation with Greek Ambassador Aghnidis, the Cabinet 
ordered Bevin to seek a solution to this enosis matter with the Greek government that favoured Britain. The 
Foreign Office’s record shows that the Cabinet opted for Greece to not raise the issue of enosis for several 
years to come (FO 371, 1947).17 
At the time Bevin was carrying out the Cabinet’s task regarding the enosis issue, Bevin was also 
being pressured by the Chancellor of Exchequer Dalton in ceasing financial and military aid to Greece (FO 
371, 1947; Hansard, 1947).18 Regarding the latter issue – a complete withdrawal of British troops from 
 
14 PREM 3/113, Churchill to Foreign Secretary, 6 June 1941; FO 371/23726, Churchill to Foreign Secretary, 6 June 1941; CAB 66/16, 
Churchill to Foreign Secretary, 6 June 1941; FO 371/29846, Churchill to Foreign Secretary, 6 June 1941; CO 67/316/13, Churchill to 
Foreign Secretary, 6 June 1941. 
15 FO 371/58891/R18129, Minutes of conference between Bevin and Aghnidis by Frederick Warner to FO, 7 December 1946. 
16 FO 371/58891/R18129, Minutes of conference between Bevin and Aghnidis by Frederick Warner to FO, 7 December 1946. 
17 FO 371/68082/R13855, CM (47), Conclusions, 18 March 1947. 
18 FO 371/67032/R1900, Minutes by Michael S. Williams (Head of the Southern Department) and Edward Warner (Official of the 
Southern Department), 18 February 1947; Hansard, 17 March 1947, Vol. 435 (London: H.M.S.O., 1947), p. 16. 
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Greece – Bevin strangely changed his stance when he agreed without arguing this matter further with Dalton 
(Dalton, 1962). It could be true to argue here that, besides Bevin’s consideration of Britain’s economic 
situation, his new stance to stop British aid to Greece was also influenced by his annoyance at the Greek 
government’s support for enosis. This was due to the fact that, when the Cabinet asked Bevin to find a 
solution with the Greek government on the enosis issue, Bevin told the Cabinet that he had taken no 
initiative to discuss it with the Greek government because he believed the effort would be pointless and 
would provoke further agitation for enosis (FO 371, 1947).19 
It is worth noting here that Britain’s withdrawal from Greece would not weaken the Greek Royalist 
government’s army because American assistance in Greece was forthcoming. The United States agreed to 
take over Britain’s burden in assisting Greece against communist insurgents through its economic aid, 
namely the Truman Doctrine. Therefore, Britain could still protect its sphere of influence in Greece and the 
Eastern Mediterranean region from the Soviet Union through American assistance, even after Britain’s 
withdrawal from Greece.     
 
7. Conclusion 
Greece was significant to Britain in regards to its national and strategic interests in the 
Mediterranean area. Thus, it was of utmost importance for Britain to halt communist encroachment in 
Greece. This matter explains the reason for Britain’s, and specifically Bevin’s, continued financial and 
military support in Greece during its Civil War, even though Britain was facing bankruptcy. The same 
consideration can be applied to Cyprus, where Bevin was determined to refuse the issue of enosis so that 
Cyprus remained under British sovereignty. 
The enosis movement emerged with the renewal of valuable support from the Greek government 
after World War II ended. As a result, the campaign for enosis grew stronger and more organised. With 
massive support from Greece, the Greek Cypriots expected that enosis would be easier to attain. But Britain 
did not acquiesce to this demand. Later, since Bevin agreed to the evacuation plan in March 1947, Greece 
too retracted its support for enosis. Considering that these two circumstances followed immediately after 
the other, surely Greece was aware that Britain, and specifically Bevin, was adamant in keeping Cyprus 
under British rule, and that the cessation of Britain’s aid to Greece was apparently an act of retribution for 
Greece’s earlier welcoming attitude for enosis. 
This article focused on Britain’s perspective regarding the withdrawal issue in Greece. While 
understanding that there were domestic issues in Britain that affected the withdrawal of British forces in 
Greece, this article specifically studied Secretary of State Bevin’s perspectives to explain Britain’s decision 
to evacuate Greece while the Greek Civil War was being fiercely fought between the communist insurgents 
and the Greek Royalist government. This article admits that it has yet to present a full account on this issue 
as there are many other angles to be looked at; for instance, the perspective of Greece itself, which still 
needs more studies for a complete understanding of this issue. Therefore, analysing this issue from the 
perspective of Greece is recommended for future studies so that it could present a comprehensive review 
regarding this withdrawal issue. 
 
 
19 FO 371/68082/R13855, CM (47), Conclusions, 18 March 1947. 
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